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Qualitative research in education apparently has come of age. There is a 
growing recognition that quantitative study, though important, does not do 
justice to the complexity of human reality. As a consequence, new courses, new 
programs, and new line items for qualitative researchers are appearing in 
colleges of education. At the University of Florida, for example, we recently 
approved a 12-hour qualitative research track for doctoral students. Three 
qualitative research methods courses are offered in the college and three more 
can be taken in the departments of Anthropology and Sociology and in the College 
of Nursing. We will offer a new graduate course in Qualitative Educational 
Psychology in the fall of 1987. In January 1988, The International Journal of 
Qualitative Studies in Education will be launched, sponsored by the University 
of Florida and published by Taylor and Francis in London. Two issues of the 
Journal of Thought recently were devoted to qualitative research methods.1 
The articles in these issues, together with previously unpublished material, 
will be published in book form by Falmer Press in 1988.2 
Despite the new enthusiasm for qualitative research, there is as yet no 
agreed-upon meaning for the term "qualitative research." Most of us use the 
phrase as a synonym for a specific research methodology, usually ethnography. 
Such narrowness not only drums out of the qualitative corps a small legion of 
time-honored methods, but it also prohibits inquiry into the nature of qualita-
tive study. Such an inquiry might reveal that all qualitative methods have some 
important things in common. Ethnography, history, biography, life history, 
social philosophy, curriculum criticism, critical theory, phenomenography, 
literary criticism, and other qualitative methods certainly are different from 
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one another. But there may be an underlying unity in this variety that tells us 
some important things about educational research. 
In order to explore this possibility, we have asked a number of experts to 
discuss specific forms of qualitative research in the issues of the Journal of 
Thought cited above. Each clarified the nature and process of their method, 
discussed what it had contributed to the study of education, and explained what 
made the method distinctively qualitative. We believe that seven characteris-
tics can be found in every qualitative research methodology: 
• First, all qualitative methods resist the "context stripping" that 
characterize so much of positivistic social science. 
• Second, the contexts described and analyzed in qualitative research 
are not contrived or modified, but are natural and must be taken as 
they are found. Social contexts are not predefined by researchers 
and findings are not forced into preestablished categories. 
Further, most qualitative methods are non-interventionist. 
• Third, attention is given to the socially constructed reality of 
actors in their natural settings. There is an interest in the 
mundane, quotidian, taken-for-granted nature of everyday life. 
• Fourth, qualitative research deals unashamedly with human 
experience. 
Our last three characteristics can be more easily explained by turning to 
John Dewey's work for illustration. Dewey accused positivistic social science 
of having an unreasonable "devotion to physical science as a model, and a mis-
conception of physical science at that." He pointed out the difference between 
physical and social facts. A fact in the physical sciences, he said, ". . . is 
the ultimate residue after human purposes, desires, emotions, ideas and ideals 
have been systematically excluded. A social fact, on the other hand, is a con-
cretion in external form of precisely these human f a c t o r s . D e w e y contends 
that human experience must be studied in context, as a whole. This means that 
experience must be understood in the context of a situation and that situations, 
in turn, must be understood in the context of a larger institutional and 
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cultural setting. In our inquiry, the fifth characteristic of qualitative 
research was a devotion to whole-ism. 
Capturing experience whole-istically, i.e., in context, is a tricky busi-
ness, entailing as Geertz has stated: 
. . . a continuous dialectical tacking between the most local of local 
details and the most global of global structure in such a way as to 
bring both into view simultaneously. . . . Hopping back and forth 
between the whole, conceived through the parts which actualize it, and 
the parts, conceived through the whole which motivates them, we seek 
to turn them, by a sort of intellectual perpetual motion, into expli-
cations of one a n o t h e r . 5 
Qualitative research provides methods that guide inquiry into human experi-
ence and, as Richard Bernstein notes, guard against: 
. . . facilely projecting our own well-entrenched beliefs, attitudes, 
classifications, and symbolic forms onto . . . alien phenomenon. 
While this is an art that requires patience, imagination, attention to 
detail, and insight—and cannot be completely captured by the specifi-
cation of rules and procedure—it is certainly a rational activity in 
which we can discriminate better and worse understandings and inter-
pretations of the phenomenon.6 
Bernstein has also noted that the major differences between positivistic 
science and qualitative disciplines "lies precisely in the attitude that the 
practicing scientist takes toward the history of his discipline."7 Quantita-
tive research has a short shelf life. Few things are as uninteresting or as 
useless as an out-of-date report from the quantitative sciences. As Kuhn has 
stated, "Unlike art, science destroys its past."® The old discovery must 
always give way to the new breakthrough. The education of the natural scientist 
dwells in the present, in today's knowledge and speculations. Good qualitative 
research, on the other hand, has enduring value, and the education of a qualita-
tive researcher demands attention to the history of his or her discipline. 
Think of what we are still learning (and wish others would learn) from such 
books as Callahan's Education and the Cult of Efficiency, Waller's Sociology of 
Teaching, the Lynd's Middletown studies, Hoi1ingshead's Elmtown's Youth, and 
Dewey's Democracy and Education. 
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To sum up, the sixth characteristic of all qualitative methods is that they 
seek to discover possibilities in experience, and the patterns or relat ionships 
among events. Seventh, and finally, all qualitative methods contain elements of 
judging and appraising. Their aim is to give an appraisal of the qualitative 
situation, the parts and the whole, and an indication of the particularity that 
may lie in the actualities. This should enable the researcher to recommend 
something to do, or to try, in dealing further with the qualitative situation. 
These seven similarities are important, but they do not take us deep enough into 
the meaning of qualitative. 
For a more complete understanding, we consulted Dewey, not in an effort to 
simply repeat his views, but as a source of insight. Dewey understood that 
social science must study the taken-for-granted world of everday life, "the 
world in which we immediately live." That world, said Dewey, ". . . is pre-
eminently . . . q u a l i t a t i v e T h e unity that defines the character of a 
culture, an institution, a personality, a work of art, or a situation is funda-
mentally qualitative. In Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, Dewey gives a useful 
example of what he means by qualitative unity. 
A painting is said to have quality, or a particular painting is said 
to have . . . a Rembrandt quality. The word [quality] does not refer 
to any particular line, color or part of the painting. It . . . modi-
fies all the constituents of the picture and all their relations.10 
That is to say, the task of social science is to render intelligible the quali-
tative unity that gives a person, an event, an institution, or a culture its own 
pervasive character. We must discover and then spell out the unique quality 
that gives meaning to a Rembrandt painting, a Blake poem, a Hemingway novel, the 
Civil War, a motorcycle gang, a democratic workplace, or an effective school. 
This list suggests that we want to lower the barriers that presently separate 
the humanities from the social sciences. 
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The quality of a social situation, personality, or institution is not 
readily apparent or easily discovered. It is invisible, yet it permeates every 
detail, thought, and action. As Dewey explained: 
The underlying unity of qualitativeness regulates the pertinence or 
relevancy and force of every distinction and relation; it guides 
selection and rejection and the manner of utilization of all explicit 
terms. We are aware of it, not by itself, but as the background, the 
thread, and the distinctive clue in [everything we think and doj.H 
Social scientists have difficulty finding the qualitative unity in social 
settings because the qualitative dimension of those settings cannot easily be 
expressed from within. The qualitative is lodged in the patterns of a culture 
and in the pre-reflective habits of a p e r s o n a l i t y . ^ People are not usually 
aware of the qualitative unity that gives their culture its special character. 
The culture, as culture, Dewey suggests, "cannot be stated or be made explicit. 
It is taken for granted, 'understood' or implicit" in everything that occurs 
within its meaning b o u n d a r i e s . ^ Culture is the container in which all 
activity takes place. To study that container, one must step outside it. Dewey 
makes the point with an analogy: "A quart bowl cannot be held within itself or 
in any of its contents. It may, however, be contained in another bowl."!^ 
The social scientist must work outside of the cultural bowl or, more 
accurately, he or she must put the cultural bowl inside another system of 
r e l e v a n c e . T h e goal, as one anthropologist put it: 
. . . is not to achieve some inner correspondence of spirit with your 
informants; preferring like the rest of us to call their souls their 
own, they are not going to be altogether keen about such an effort 
anyhow. The trick is to figure out what the devil they think they are 
up to.16 
We must resist "going native" for, to become socialized means we will take 
for granted what our informants take for granted, and thus the qualitative unity 
of their experience will be as invisible to us as it is to them. We must work 
outside the bowl. We must find a way to enter a culture and yet stay outside. 
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That is the trick of qualitative inquiry. We must begin with what Schutz called 
"first order constructs." We can examine the socially constructed reality with 
which people make sense of their world. We can attend to their meanings, acts, 
and experiences. In order to gain understanding, we must seek the qualitative 
pattern that permeates their existence. That entails forming what Schutz called 
"second order constructs."^ These concepts are not part of the conscious 
thinking of the people being studied, but they help us understand the distinc-
tive quality of their culture. 
"Science," wrote Bronowski, "is nothing else than the search to discover 
unity in the wild variety of nature—or more exactly, in the variety of our 
experience."1® The order that exists in social environments, like the order 
of nature, usually hides itself in apparent disarray. "If it can be said to be 
there at all," Bronowski warned, "it is not there for the mere looking. There 
is no way of pointing a finger or camera at it; order must be discovered and, in 
a deep sense, it must be c r e a t e d . " 1 9 The construction of order is, in fact, 
an act of disciplined imagination, or, to use a Deweyian phrase, of "speculative 
audacity."20 Ultimately, of course, the order that researchers construct 
must square with and make sense of the reality under investigation. The goal, 
as Bronowski made clear, is to "take parts of the universe that have not been 
connected hitherto and . . . show . . . them to be connected."21 it is 
through connection and order that predictability and intelligibility are 
d iscovered. 
Dewey saw no useful division between qualitative and quantitative research. 
Such division, he once wrote, make about as much sense as "dividing botanists 
into rootists and flowerists." He complained that statistical research was 
raking up data into a "miscellaneous pile of meaningless items." He warned that 
mere statistics are not social facts. "Their connection with any system of 
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human purposes and consequences . . . are left out of the picture. There is 
nothing which binds them together into an intelligible whole."22 They 
capture quantity, but they neglect quality. Dewey's notion of the qualitative 
helps us to see what various qualitative methods have in common. But it does 
more. It shows that all social research, no matter what its method, must have a 
qualitative dimension. All human science research must grow from and ultimately 
return to human experience. 
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